(Sophos) In a series of malspam campaigns dating back to November of 2019, an unidentified group sent out waves of installers that drop remote administration tool (RAT) and information stealing malware on victims’ computers. We’ve identified five separate campaigns between November, 2019 and January, 2020 in which the payloads used similar packing code and pointed to the same command and control (C&C) infrastructure. The campaigns targeted industrial companies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Republic of Korea. This leads us to believe that they are all the work of the same actors—a group we’ve dubbed RATicate. A new campaign we believe connected to the same actors leverages concern about the global COVID-19 pandemic to convince victims to open the payloads. This is a shift in tactics, but we suspect that this group constantly changes the way they deploy malware—and that the group has conducted campaigns prior to this past November.
| TA0043 | TA0042 | TA0001 | TA0002 | TA0003 | TA0004 | TA0005 | TA0006 | TA0007 | TA0008 | TA0009 | TA0011 | TA0010 | TA0040 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Resource Development | Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
| IP:Port | Timestamp |
|---|
| Domain | Timestamp |
|---|
| URL | Timestamp |
|---|
Actor: RATicate
Names: RATicate
Country: [Unknown]
Motivation: Information theft and espionage
First-seen: 2019
Description: (Sophos) In a series of malspam campaigns dating back to November of 2019, an unidentified group sent out waves of installers that drop remote administration tool (RAT) and information stealing malware on victims’ computers. We’ve identified five separate campaigns between November, 2019 and January, 2020 in which the payloads used similar packing code and pointed to the same command and control (C&C) infrastructure. The campaigns targeted industrial companies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Republic of Korea. This leads us to believe that they are all the work of the same actors—a group we’ve dubbed RATicate. A new campaign we believe connected to the same actors leverages concern about the global COVID-19 pandemic to convince victims to open the payloads. This is a shift in tactics, but we suspect that this group constantly changes the way they deploy malware—and that the group has conducted campaigns prior to this past November.
Observed-sectors: Industrial
Observed-sectors: Manufacturing
Observed-sectors: Media
Observed-sectors: Telecommunications
Observed-countries: Romania
Observed-countries: Japan
Observed-countries: Kuwait
Observed-countries: South Korea
Observed-countries: Switzerland
Observed-countries: UK
Observed-countries: Europe and Middle East
Tools: Agent Tesla
Tools: BetaBot
Tools: BlackRAT
Tools: Formbook
Tools: GuLoader
Tools: LokiBot
Tools: NetWire RC
Tools: njRAT
Tools: NSIS
Tools: RemcosRAT
Information: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/14/raticate/
Information: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/07/14/raticate-rats-as-service-with-commercial-crypter/
Last-card-change: 2020-07-15
Source: https://apt.etda.or.th/cgi-bin/listtools.cgi
| TA0043 | TA0042 | TA0001 | TA0002 | TA0003 | TA0004 | TA0005 | TA0006 | TA0007 | TA0008 | TA0009 | TA0011 | TA0010 | TA0040 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Resource Development | Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
T1053.002 SCHEDULED TASK/JOB : AT at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time. | T1053.002 SCHEDULED TASK/JOB : AT at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time. | T1053.002 SCHEDULED TASK/JOB : AT at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time. |