(Kaspersky) DarkUniverse is an interesting example of a full cyber-espionage framework used for at least eight years. The malware contains all the necessary modules for collecting all kinds of information about the user and the infected system and appears to be fully developed from scratch. Due to unique code overlaps, we assume with medium confidence that DarkUniverse’s creators were connected with the ItaDuke set of activities. The attackers were resourceful and kept updating their malware during the full lifecycle of their operations, so the observed samples from 2017 are totally different from the initial samples from 2009. The suspension of its operations may be related to the publishing of the ‘Lost in Translation’ leak, or the attackers may simply have decided to switch to more modern approaches and start using more widely available artefacts for their operations.
| TA0043 | TA0042 | TA0001 | TA0002 | TA0003 | TA0004 | TA0005 | TA0006 | TA0007 | TA0008 | TA0009 | TA0011 | TA0010 | TA0040 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Resource Development | Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
| IP:Port | Timestamp |
|---|
| Domain | Timestamp |
|---|
| URL | Timestamp |
|---|
Actor: DarkUniverse
Names: DarkUniverse
Country: [Unknown]
Motivation: Information theft and espionage
First-seen: 2017
Description: (Kaspersky) DarkUniverse is an interesting example of a full cyber-espionage framework used for at least eight years. The malware contains all the necessary modules for collecting all kinds of information about the user and the infected system and appears to be fully developed from scratch. Due to unique code overlaps, we assume with medium confidence that DarkUniverse’s creators were connected with the ItaDuke set of activities. The attackers were resourceful and kept updating their malware during the full lifecycle of their operations, so the observed samples from 2017 are totally different from the initial samples from 2009. The suspension of its operations may be related to the publishing of the ‘Lost in Translation’ leak, or the attackers may simply have decided to switch to more modern approaches and start using more widely available artefacts for their operations.
Observed-sectors: Defense
Observed-sectors: civilian
Observed-countries: Afghanistan
Observed-countries: Belarus
Observed-countries: Ethiopia
Observed-countries: Iran
Observed-countries: Russia
Observed-countries: Sudan
Observed-countries: Syria
Observed-countries: Tanzania
Observed-countries: UAE
Observed-countries: others
Tools: dfrgntfs5.sqt
Tools: glue30.dll
Tools: msvcrt58.sqt
Tools: updater.mod
Tools: zl4vq.sqt
Information: https://securelist.com/darkuniverse-the-mysterious-apt-framework-27/94897/
Last-card-change: 2020-04-14
Source: https://apt.etda.or.th/cgi-bin/listtools.cgi
| TA0043 | TA0042 | TA0001 | TA0002 | TA0003 | TA0004 | TA0005 | TA0006 | TA0007 | TA0008 | TA0009 | TA0011 | TA0010 | TA0040 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Resource Development | Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |